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ABSTRACT 
Multinational corporations are increasingly seen as excessively big and power- 
ful, and as having dramatically increased in size and power. This perception has 
led to the view that the big corporations are threatening democratic institutions 
of the nation-states and that they pervert the c::ltiil.al and social fabric of coun- 
tries. 
In this paper we analyse the size of large corporations and the recent trends 
in this size. Using value-added data (instead of sales) we find that multination- 
als are surprisingly small compared to the GDP of many nation-states. In addi- 
tion, if anything, the size of ~nultinationals relative to the size of nations has 
tended to decline somewhat during the last 20 years. Finally, we argue that there 
is little evidence that the economic and political power of ~nultinationals has 
increased in the last few decades. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Multinationals are out of favour. This is not the first time. During the 
1960s and the 1970s multinational coinpanies, especially the American 
variety, were seen as institutions increasingly bent on dominating the 
world. It was the time of the best-selling "The American Challenge" 
of Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, which became veiy influential in 
Europe, and which argued that thanks to sophisticated management 
methods, large American enterprises would take over Europe and the 
world. Being large and American was ugly in those days. 
Then came the 1980s. Perceptions shifted completely. Instead of 
being perceived as evil forces, large corporations suddenly becaine 
the symbols of progress in an increasingly integrating world. The geil- 
erations of yuppies were impatient to be hired by the symbols of suc- 
cess of the day, the large corporations, preferably American. 
Since a few years the pendulum has swung again. Under the influ- 
ence of the anti-globalist movement, big multinationals are out of 
favour. Like in the days of Servan-Schreiber, today's best-selling 
books on the subject argue that the inultinationals have become so big 
that they threaten our democratic institutions and pervert our culture. 
In her book "The Silent Takeover" Hei-tz claiins that the big multina- 
tionals have become so powerful that they destroy the very fabric of 
our democratic societies. In the same vein Naomi Klein argues that big 
corporations don't sell physical but emotional products thereby chang- 
ing and perverting our cultural landscape. 
The starting point of all these analyses is a double claim. First, multi- 
national corporations are very big. The most popular way to express 
this is that among the 100 biggest "economies" in the world 51 are 
corporations and only 49 are countries, giving the impression that large 
corporations are now larger than the average nation-state (see Anderson 
and Cavanagh (2000) who were the first to use these numbers). 
The second claiin is that the size of multinationals is greater than 
ever. It is not difficult to find statistics that will buttress this claim. 
Indeed, measured in the doiiar value of their sales and assets, multi- 
national companies are bigger than ever. 
These two empirical claims form the backbone of much of the 
analysis in the anti-globalist literature surrounding the excessive and 
pernicious power of multinationals. 
In this paper we analyse these two claims. First we try to measure 
the size of the large corporations of the world. In order to make sense 
we need a benchmark. This will be the nation-state. We will analyse 
the question of how big the big multinationals are in relation to coun- 
tries. 
Second, we will study how the size of multinationals has evolved 
relative to the size of the same nation-states. Nobody will question 
the fact that the big inultinationals are bigger than ever, but so are the 
economies of countries. The relevant question here is how the size of 
the multinationals has evolved relative to that of countries. 
11. THE SIZE OF LARGE CORPORATIONS 
When comparing the size of corporations to that of nations the sales 
of these corporations are almost invariably set against the GDP of 
countries. T~ILIS, when anti-globalists claiin that out of the 100 largest 
economies 5 1 are corporations and only 49 are countries they compare 
the sales of corporations with the GDP of nations. Sales and GDP, 
however, are not comparable. The GDP of a nation is the sum of the 
values added by each producer. It is not the sum of total sales of these 
producers. The reason why one does not want to add the total sales of 
all producers is that this would lead to a lot of double counting. 
To give a few examples. Bethlehem Steel sells steel wire to 
Bridgestone during, say 2002. During the same year Bridgestone sells 
tires to Ford Motor company. The latter then sells cars to final con- 
sumers also in 2002. If we add the sales of the steel, the tyre and the 
car colilpanies we will count the steel wires three times. As a result, 
we will overestimate the value of what is produced in the countly. 
In order to avoid this overestimation, economists only count the value 
added in the three companies. They then count steel wire only once, 
i.e. when produced and sold by Bethlehem Steel. They subtract the 
value of the steel wire (and of all the other intermediate deliveries) 
from the sales of Bridgestone and Ford. 
Many other examples of double and triple counting can be given 
when sales are added. Thus, when comparing the size of corporations 
(using sales) with the size of nations (using GDP) we overestimate the 
relative size of corporations. 
In order to avoid this problem we computed the value added of 
corporations. The value added is defined as sales minus intermediate 
deliveries. Alternatively, and equivalently, it can be defined as the 
sum of the remuneration of labour and capital en~ployed in the firm. 
We took the latter definition to compute value added. Unfortunately 
we could not obtain the relevant information for all corporations. 
In fact, only a few of thein provide enough data from their annual 
accounts to make the calculation. We, therefore, used a sample of 
corporations for which data were available. The results for industrial 
corporations are shown in Table 1. We observe that value added 
accounts for approximately 25% of sales. We used this number to 
extrapolate to other industrial corporations. Admittedly this is rather 
crude, but we are confident that the ratio of value added in sales is 
of a similar order of magnitude in most industrial companies in our 
sample. 
The data of service companies were more difficult to collect. 
Contrary to the industrial companies there is also a greater difference 
between service comnpanies. We found that on average value added in 
service companies amounted to 35%. We apply this number to all ser- 
vice companies in the sainple. 
To find the largest corporations in the world we used the "Fortune 
magazine's Global 500 list" of the year 2000. The source for GDP 
was the World Bank. We then classified countries and corporations 
according to value added (GDP). The results are shown in Table 2. 
We now find that of the 100 largest economies, 63 are countries and 
37 are corporations. More iinportantly, among the top 50 econoinies 
only 2 (Exxon, Wall Mart) are corporations. But this way of present- 
ing the results does not give a right indication of relative size, because 
the large countries in the world are much larger than the largest 
TABLE 1 
Sales and value added in Jive of the top ten cor~ol-ations in 2000 
Coinpally Sales Value added Value addedlsales 
General Motors 184.632 42.175 22,8% 
Ford 170.064 46.802 27,5% 
Dai~nlerChryslcr 162.354 44.438 27,4% 
Royal DutchiShell Group 149.146 36.294 24,3% 
British Petroleum 148.062 33.536 22,6% 
Avevage 24,9% 
Source: computed from companies' annual accounts 
Note: Value added is defined as the sun1 of total wages, depreciation and amortisation 
expenses, and profits before taxes 
corporations. To give some examples, the US economy is 200 times 
bigger than the biggest corporation; Japan is 100 times bigger, China 
20 times bigger than the largest corporation. Even small countries like 
Belgium, Sweden, Austria are three to five times bigger than the 
largest multinational. Put more synthetically, the value added produced 
by the 50 largest corporations represents only 4.5% of the value added 
produced by the 50 largest countries. Thus, as a whole the big 
multinationals of this world are a great deal smaller than the present 
anti-globalist rhetoric has led us to believe. This is made visually very 
vivid in Figure 1 where we present the same information as in Table 2. 
It appears that the big multinationals (dark colour in the figure) belong 
to the league of the very small countries. (In appendix we produce 
the same figure, but using sales instead of vahe  added to show 
that even when we use sales to compare with GDP, the size of 
multinationals turns out to be smaller than is suggested by the state- 
ment that out of 100 economies, 5 1 are inultinationals, and only 49 are 
countries). 
This is not to say that some corporations are not big in relation to 
some small countries. Wall Mart, the biggest company measured by 
value added, is bigger than Pakistan, Peru and Algeria; Exxon is big- 
ger than the Czech Republic, New Zealand, and many other small 
countries. But the impression gained by the anti-globalist rhetoric is 
that corporations are now typically bigger than the typical country in 
the world. And this is manifestly incorrect. 
TABLE 2 
Cozlntr-ies and corporations classified according to value added/GDP 
(billion dollars) in 2000 
USA 
Japan 
Germany 
United Kingdom 
France 
China 
Italy 
Canada 
Brazil 
Mexico 
Spain 
Bangladesh 
U AE 
General Motors 
Hungary 
Ford Motor 
Mztsz~blsh~ 
M~tsuz 
Nigeria 
C~tlgrozp 
Itochll 
Da~mlerChr-y~leu 
12 India 
13 Korea, Rep. 
14 Australia 
15 Netherlands 
16 Argentina 
17 Russia 
18 Switzerland 
19 Belgium 
20 Sweden 
21 Turkey 
22 Austria 
23 Hong Kong 
24 Poland 
25 Denmark 
26 Indonesia 
27 Norway 
28 Saudi Arabia 
29 South Africa 
30 Thailand 
31 Venezuela 
32 Finland 
33 Greece 
34 Israel 
35 Portugal 
36 Iran 
37 Egypt 
38 Ireland 
39 Sillgapore 
40 Malaysia 
41 Coloinbia 
42 Philippines 
43 Chile 
44 Wal-Mart Sfores 
45 Pakistan 
46 Peru 
47 Algeria 
48 Exxon 
49 Czech Republic 
50 New Zealand 
62 Royal Dutch/Shell 
63 BP 
64 Romania 
65 Nippon T&T 
66 Ukraine 
67 Morocco 
68 RriA 
69 General Electric 
70 Szlrnitorno 
71 Vietnam 
72 Toyota Motor 
73 Belarus 
74 Mavzrbeni 
75 Kuwait 
76 Total Fina Elf 
77 Envon 
78 ING Grozlp 
79 Allianz Holding 
80 E.0N 
81 Nippon life insurance 
82 Dezrtsche Bank 
83 AT&T 
84 Verizon Comm. 
85 US Postal Service 
86 Croatia 
87 IBM 
88 CGIW 
89 JP Morgan Chase 
90 Carrefour 
91 Credit Suisse 
92 Nissho Iwai 
93 Bank of America Corp 
94 BNP Paribas 
95 Volkswagen 
96 Doininican Republic 
97 Uruguay 
98 Tunisia 
99 Slovac Republic 
100 Hitachi 
Sozwce: World Bank and Fortune Magazine 
FIGUUR 1 
GDP (counil-ies) and valzre added (co~po~af ions)  in 2000 (billion $1 
111. HAVE BIG MULTINATIONAL BECOME BIGGER? 
The second claim made by the critics of multinatioilals is that these 
have become larger compared to the nation state, thereby threatening 
the political, social and cultural integrity of these nations. But is it 
tiue that multinationals are now larger than in the past compared to 
countries? 
We analyse how the size of industrial corporations has grown rela- 
tive to the size of countries from 1980 to 2000. Because of a lack of 
data we could not compute the value added of corporations in the year 
1980. We use the growth rate of the sales figures as an estiinator for 
the growth rate of the added values. 
We took the top-50 industrial corporations from the Fostune 500 list 
in the years 1980 and 2000 and computed the growth of the sales 
(in current dollars) of these top-50 corporations during 1980-2000. 
We compared this number with the growth of the world's GDP over the 
same period (also in current dollars). The results are shown in F i g ~ ~ r e  2. 
The striking aspect of this result is that the world as a whole has grown 
(slightly) faster than the largest 50 corporations. As a result, in the year 
2000 the 50 largest industrial corporations were slightly smaller in rela- 
tion to World GDP than the 50 largest corporations in 1980. 
FIGURE 2 
Evolution of the size of top-50 corporatzons and World-GDP 
(in col~stni~t dollars, I Y H U  = IOU) 
Source: World Bank and Fortune Magazine 
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Thus the big multinationals have not become bigger when com- 
pared to the world as a whole. Obviously there are large regional dif- 
ferences. Some regions of the world have grown inuch faster than 
others. As a result, the big multinatioilals have shrunk in relative size 
in some regions (e.g. East-Asia) while they have increased in relative 
size in other regions (e.g. Africa). We show the regional growth rates 
in Figure 3. The interesting aspect of these regional differences is that 
the big multinationals have shrunk in relative size in those regions 
where they have become most active (East Asia) while they have 
grown in relative size where big multinationals have been relatively 
absent (Africa). Thus, countries that have followed open door poli- 
cies have been growiilg fast so that their size has increased faster than 
that of the multinationals. 
To suin up. The perception today is that multinationals are over- 
whelmingly large and that their size has increased drainatically in 
FIGURE 3 
Average yearlv growth of GDP (1980-2000) in clin-ent dollars 
Sozrrce: World Bank 
recent times, thereby threatening the integrity of the nation-states. 
There is no doubt that multinationals are large and that their size has 
increased. Surprisingly though multinational companies are not as big 
as it seems. The 37 largest corporations that appear in the list of the 
100 largest economies create value added that represents less than 4% 
of the value added created by the top 37 countries in that list. 
Moreover, the m~~ltinatlonals have not become larger in relation to the 
nation-states during the last twenty years. Why are the perceptions so 
different from the observed facts? We return to this question in our 
conclusion. 
IXJ. SIZE PJ'JD POWER 
The fact that the multinationals are not as big as we thought and that 
they have not grown faster than the nation states does not say much 
about the power of these multinationals. The latter may exert consid- 
erable power, and this power may have increased. Although size and 
power are correlated, the correlation is far from perfect. Certainly, the 
perception today (again) is that the power of multinationals is large 
and that this power has increased. 
Contrary to size, power is difficult to measure. We can only infer 
indirectly how large this power is. In this connection it is usefill to dis- 
tinguish between economic and political power. 
With economic power we mean the capacity of corporations to 
impose a price that exceeds marginal costs, and thereby to make 
"excess" profits. The extent to which corporations are capable of doing 
this depends on two factors. One is the degree of substitutability of the 
products these corporations sell. If consumers have easy alternatives, 
the corporation will not be able to charge prices much in excess of 
marginal cost. The second factor is competition. The smaller the num- 
ber of competitors the higher the capacity of corporations to charge a 
price above marginal costs, and to make excess profits. In the limit of 
monopoly power, this capacity is at its highest. 
How has the economic power of corporations evolved during the 
last decades? Economists have done a lot of research on this issue. 
They have measured economic power by computing concentration 
indices, i.e. indices that measure the market share of, say, the top four 
companies in a given market. On the whole the empirical evidence 
tends to be inconclusive. There is no evidence that these concentration 
indices have increased systematically. In some sectors, concentration 
has increased, in others it has declined. For example, not so long ago 
the domestic telephone coinpally had a local monopoly power in 
almost all countries in the world. Today, the situation is very differ- 
ent with several telecommunication companies competing in the same 
markets. In the market for software, concentration seems to have 
increased with one company, Microsoft, taking an increasing share of 
the market in many countries. 
More than 150 years ago, Marx predicted that capitalism would 
increasii~gly lead to monopolies. The anti-globalist movement has 
espoused the same prediction. Up to now this prediction has not come 
through. It is unlikely that the anti-globalists will have a better pre- 
dictive record thar? Marx. 
What about the political power of corporations? Has this increased 
during the last decades? Political power is even more difficult to mea- 
sure than econoinic power. In addition, political and economic of cor- 
porations are intertwined. The basic power mechanism can be described 
as follows. A successful corporation is the one, which drives out com- 
petitors because of a better andlor cheaper product. The ultimate suc- 
cess a corporation can achieve is to sell a superior product that drives 
out all the competitors. This successful corporation then achieves a 
monopoly position. This is not necessarily a problem if new cornpallies 
can enter the market. The threat of such new entries can be sufficient 
to prevent the incumbent company from abusing its monopoly power. 
This incumbent, however, will have a strong temptation to abuse its 
monopoly position (and to make excess profits) by erecting barriers to 
entry. The latter can, however, not easily be done except by bribing 
politicians who can erect legal barriers to entry. Thus, very successful 
corporations end up investing in political power, so as to maintain and 
to solidify their hold in a particular market. Has the capacity of cor- 
porations to engage in such practices increased? Given the nature of the 
problem it will be difficult to give a definitive answer. 
There is an indirect way to measure the evolution of the political 
and cconornic power of corporations. This is to ai~alyse how quickly 
corporations come and go. In a world where the large corporations 
remain the same for loiig periods of time, it is likely that these cor- 
porations will be able to develop stronger political networks helping 
thein to better maintain their positions in the market. Conversely, when 
the companies at the top come and go q~~icltly, their capacity to build 
up political power will be limited. 
In order to get some insight about this issue we analysed how 
quickly the composition of the top-10, top-20 and top-50 industrial 
corporations (Fortune list) has changed since 1980. (Because of insuf- 
ficient data for the period before 1994 we had to restrict this analysis 
to industrial companies). We show the result in Figure 4. This shows 
how many of the initial companies appearing in the top-10, top-20 
and top-50 in 1980 remain in the top in the consecutive years. We find 
that in twenty years time only about half of the initial companies 
appearing in these lists have been able to keep their positions. 
The other half has been replaced by newcomers. Thus the group of 
large corporations is not a static one. It is continuously changing and 
renewing itself. This is good news in the sense that a large part of 
those who were powerfi~l in the past have lost some (or all) of their 
power, while others who had little power, increased it quicltly. All this 
suggests that corporate power is elusive and can quickly change. 
Since 1994 there is also information available for service companies. 
We did the same analysis for the period 1994-2000 for both the service 
FIGURE 4 
Number of coinpanzes relnaznzng In the top-10, top-20 and top-50 lzsts 
I 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 1 
Sozlrce: Fortune magazine 
and the industrial conlpanies. We show the results in Figure 5 .  Although 
the period is very short, so that strong conclusions are difficult to derive, 
it is striking to find that service coinpallies have tended to disappear 
from the top positions at a faster rate than industrial companies. 
Finally, we also analysed the evolution of the dispersion of the size 
of the companies within each top list. The size concentration within 
each top list can be used as an indicator of power. The more uilequal 
is the distribution of size within each top list, the greater is the poten- 
tial power position of the companies at the top of the list. We com- 
puted the coefficient of variation and its evolution oves time. We show 
the result in Figure 6. It is striking to find that the coefficient of vari- 
ation has tended to decline during 1994-2000. This suggests that the 
distributions of the size of companies in the top-10. top-20 and 
top-50 lists have become more equal. This in turn suggests that the rel- 
ative power position of those at the top of the list has tended to 
decline. Again the period is relatively short, so that it is not clear 
whether this is the result of a trend or a cyclical movement. 
FIGURE 5 
~Vzmbel- of coinpaniw reinaii~zng in the top-10, top-20 mid top-50 lists 
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FIGURE 6 
Coefiicients ofvariatio~z ofthe size of companies 
Sozirce: Fortulle magazine 
V. CONCLUSION 
Multinational corporations are increasingly seen as excessively big 
and powerful, and as having dramatically increased in size and power. 
This perception has led to the view that the big corporations are threat- 
ening democratic institutions of the nation-states and that they per- 
vert the cultural and social fabric of countries. 
In this paper we analysed the size of large corporations and the 
recent trends in this size. We found that inultiilationals are surpris- 
ingly sinall compared to many nation-states. In addition, if anything 
the size of multinationals relative to the size of nations has tended to 
decline somewhat during the last 20 years. Finally, we argued that 
there is little evidence that the economic and political power of multi- 
nationals has increased in the last few decades. 
Multinationals have not grown in size relative to the nation-states 
nor have they become more powerful in the last twenty years. And yet 
the perception is very different. This leads to the conclusion that what 
has changed is not the economic reality. The big transformation has 
been in the perception of that reality. Many people now perceive the 
multinationals as having grown in size and power, while they did not 
(or not to the same extent) 20 years ago. Why is it that perceptions can 
change so drastically while the underlying economic reality has 
changed so little? 
A satisfactory answer is difficult to give. The popularity of ideas 
seeins to evolve in a cyclical manner very much like fashion does. 
During the 1960s and 1970s anti-capitalist ideas were fashionable. 
They went out of fashion in the 1980s, but came back in full force dur- 
ing the second half of the 1990s. Maybe all this is inevitable in a world 
where the human mind tries to understand how "the system" finc- 
tions. Faced with great uncertainty about the fi~nctioning of the econ- 
omy, people try one theory, then discard it to search for one that fits 
the data better, until the new theory is found. The result of this groping 
for understanding is that ideas and perceptions are subject to large 
cyclical movements, even if the underlying reality does not exhibit 
such movements. 
APPENDIX 
GDP ofco~~iitl-ies/Sule.s of'coi?lpnilies ;?I 2000 
,Vote: dark entries are co~lipanies 
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